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Abstract
Using a simple economic model in which social-distancing reduces contagion,
we study the implications of waning immunity for the epidemiological dynamics
and social activity. If immunity wanes, we find that COVID-19 likely becomes en-
demic and that social-distancing is here to stay until the discovery of a vaccine or
cure. But waning immunity does not necessarily change optimal actions on the on-
set of the pandemic. Decentralized equilibria are virtually independent of waning
immunity until close to peak infections. For centralized equilibria, the relevance of
waning immunity decreases in the probability of finding a vaccine or cure, the costs
of infection (e.g., infection-fatality rate), and the presence of other NPIs that lower
contagion (e.g., quarantining andmask use). In simulations calibrated to July 2020,
our model suggests that waning immunity is virtually unimportant for centralized
equilibria until at least 2021. This provides vital time for individuals and policy-
makers to learn about immunity against SARS-CoV-2 before it becomes critical.
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1 Introduction
We do not know yet the duration of immunity against severe acute respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causing coronavirus infectious disease 2019 (COVID-
19). But early evidence points to waning immunity against SARS-CoV-2 (Seow et al.,
2020) and we know that immunity against other coronaviruses wanes within two years
(Edridge et al., 2020; Huang et al., 2020; Kellam and Barclay, 2020).
If immunity against COVID-19 indeed wanes, then COVID-19 likely becomes en-
demic and herd immunity cannot be naturally reached. Therefore, ignoring waning
immunity may lead to costly policies with irreversible consequences. Despite these
risks, almost all the economics literature on the COVID-19 pandemic assumes perma-
nent immunity.1 Our paper fills this gap in the literature by assessing the implications
of waning immunity for decentralized and centralized equilibria in an economicmodel
of an epidemic.
In the model, decision makers are constrained by disease contagion and maximize
the difference between the utility from social activity and the cost of infection. The
utility from social activity captures, in a stylized way, all the payoffs from economic
and social actions that require physical proximity. Our approach is grounded in three
reasons.2 First, the main economic impact of the pandemic has been on sectors that
rely on physical proximity (Chetty et al., 2020). Second, there are also other significant
costs of constrained social activity such as anxiety, distress, fatigue, and domestic vio-
lence (Ravindran and Shah, 2020; Serafini et al., 2020). Third, contagion of virus causing
respiratory diseases is mostly unrelated with consumption and work (Ferguson et al.,
2006; Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt, 2020a) but can be influenced by behavior.
The epidemiological dynamics in the model is based on recurrence relations be-
tween three (main) health states: susceptible (S), infected (I), and recovered (R) with
the flow pattern S → I → R→ S (and hence the conventional labeling SIRS).3 An SIRS
model nests both SIR and SIS models.4 The canonical SIR model (Kermack and McK-
1In an already large and fast-growing economics literature addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, we are
only aware of three papers allowing for waning immunity. We contrast our paper with these three papers
below. The assumption of permanent immunity is also common outside of the economics literature: e.g.,
Ferguson et al. (2020) andWang et al. (2020).
2Among various approaches to study epidemics in economic models, ours follows Farboodi, Jarosch
and Shimer (2020), Garibaldi, Moen and Pissarides (2020), Guimara˜es (2020), and Toxvaerd (2020) by di-
rectly modeling the choice of social activity. Another approach is to assume contacts are a function of
the level and type of i) consumption (Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt, 2020a,b; Krueger, Uhlig and
Xie, 2020) and/or ii) labor (Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt, 2020a,b; Glover et al., 2020). Yet another
approach is treating pandemics as exogenous shifts in state variables (e.g., human capital) (Boucekkine,
Diene and Azomahou, 2008). Such an approach resembles the MIT shock assessed by Guerrieri et al.
(2020) in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. See also Philipson and Posner (1993), Kremer (1996),
Chakraborty, Papageorgiou and Pe´rez Sebastia´n (2010) and Greenwood et al. (2019) for an economic per-
spective of HIV and malaria.
3The flow from recovered to susceptible stems fromwaning immunity.
4For an accessible review of epidemiological models, see Hethcote (2000).
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endrick, 1927) assumes that agents are permanently immune after they recover from
the infection and is widely used in the economics literature addressing the COVID-19
pandemic (e.g., Alvarez, Argente and Lippi, 2020; Atkeson, 2020; Eichenbaum, Rebelo
and Trabandt, 2020a; Farboodi, Jarosch and Shimer, 2020). The canonical SISmodel as-
sumes that agents are never immune and, thus, is employed in studying the economics
of recurrent diseases (e.g., Goenka and Liu, 2012, 2019; Goenka, Liu andNguyen, 2014).
An SIRS model is between an SIR and an SIS model by allowing agents to be immune
but only temporarily. In light of the evidence on immunity against SARS-CoV-2 and
other coronaviruses, an SIRS model is warranted to study the COVID-19 pandemic
(Kellam and Barclay, 2020).
In the canonical SIRS model, immunity is a binary variable: agents are either im-
mune or not. And after agents lose immunity they become as susceptible as any other
susceptible agent. Waning immunity, however, does not necessarily mean that agents
who lose immunity are as unprotected as those who were never infected (Punt et al.,
2018; Huang et al., 2020).5 Immunological memory (e.g., antibody count) might not
be enough to avoid a reinfection but is likely enough for the body to react faster to a
reinfection. For this reason, our SIRS block allows susceptible agents to differ among
themselves based on infection history. The heterogeneity in infection history can be
captured by distinct i) probabilities of being infected, ii) recovery speed, iii) viral shed-
ding, and iv) cost of infection. These possible distinctions are important as they may
prevent an endemic COVID-19.
In Section 4, we analyze the simplest case in which all susceptible agents, irrespec-
tive of their infection history, are alike. We reach two main conclusions. First, if im-
munological memory wanes, there is no vaccine or cure, and there is no major exoge-
nous change in the contagiousness of the virus, then COVID-19 becomes endemic be-
cause of the continuous flow of agents into the susceptible health state. In this scenario,
both a social planner and decentralized individuals choose to social-distance forever.
Second, the duration of immunity may not meaningfully change optimal choices in
the initial months of the pandemic. We find that the decentralized equilibria is virtu-
ally independent of waning immunity for more than six months and until close to peak
infections because agents abstract from how their actions affect the probability that
they are reinfected later. In slight contrast, we find that the centralized equilibria may
vary with waning immunity depending on the costs of infection and the probability of
finding a vaccine or cure.
An endemicCOVID-19, induced bywaning immunity, implies a higher present value
of infection costs than a non-endemic one. In response to these higher costs, the social
planner mandates further social-distancing. Yet, this extra social-distancing stemming
from waning immunity can be small in the short run. If a vaccine is expected in 18
months and the costs of infection reflect an infection-fatality rate of 0.64%, we find
5In particular, Huang et al. (2020) report that individuals can be infected with the same human coron-
aviruses one year after first infection but with lower severity.
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that optimal centralized policies are almost independent of waning immunity for more
than 12 months. In this case, the short-term costs of infection are so high that the so-
cial planner severely constrains social activity to postpone those costs and wait for a
vaccine. As social activity is already highly constrained, the marginal cost for society
to further increase social-distancing is huge. Thus, the social planner finds that the
expected costs due to the endemic steady-state are of little relative importance in the
short-term and almost does not react to them. In other words, when the short-term
costs of the pandemic are very large, waning immunity is relatively unimportant at the
early months of the pandemic.
If, on the other hand, the costs of infection are low (e.g., reflecting an infection-
fatality rate close to 0.2%), the costs of the pandemic are lower and the social planner
mandates less social-distancing. As the costs are lower, the marginal cost of social-
distancing are not prohibitively high, giving the social planner room for maneuver
to act early to the prospect of the endemic steady-state. Therefore, when immunity
wanes, the social planner prefers to mandate relatively more social-distancing in the
early months of the pandemic to reduce the costs of the endemic steady-state and gain
time for a vaccine to arrive. Finally, a lower probability of discovering a vaccine in-
creases the weight of future utility in the objective function in the same way as a lower
discount factor does. This has an entirely different effect depending on waning im-
munity. When immunity is permanent, future utility is relatively high as the pandemic
asymptotically disappears, which demotivates the social planner to postpone infec-
tions andmandate social-distancing. But, if immunity wanes in 10months or two years
on average, the present value of the costs of an endemic COVID-19 increasewhen a vac-
cine is expected to arrive late. Therefore, the social planner prefers to social-distance
even more in the early days of the pandemic and act early to the problem of waning
immunity. In sum, waning immunity only meaningfully changes centralized policies
when the probability of discovering a vaccine is low or the societal marginal costs of
acting early to the endemic steady-state are not unbearably high.
In Section 5, we analyze the case in which immunity wanes but susceptible agents
differ based on infection history. Consistent with our previous results, if a vaccine is
expected in 18 months and the costs of infections reflect an infection-fatality rate of
0.64%, knowing whether susceptible agents differ based on infection history is not crit-
ical in the initial months of the epidemic. Furthermore, if agents that lost immunity are
less likely to be infected or shed less virus, then COVID-19 does not become endemic.
In this scenario, lower costs of infection and lower probability of finding a vaccine lead
to markedly different choices in the short run. Thus, it is important to know whether
immunity wanes and whether susceptible agents notably differ based on infection his-
tory. Finally, we find that susceptible agents thatwere immune canbe excessively active
from a social viewpoint, especially if they suffer much less from a reinfection, because
they abstract from the risk of infecting others. Thus, policymakers should be aware of
this extra source of risk if immunity wanes.
In a last set of simulations, in Section 6, we change the starting date of the simu-
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lations. Our previous results are based on initial conditions matching the start of the
COVID-19 pandemic. But, our results might differ as we are about six months past that
in July 2020 and as other non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) are in place besides
social-distancing (e.g., mandatorymask use and quarantining of identified infected in-
dividuals). We find that, even if COVID-19 becomes endemic, the other NPIs in place
allow formuchmore social activity. Furthermore, learning how the infection history af-
fects the protection of individuals against reinfections becomes less important as con-
tagion falls substantially. In fact, even a low probability of finding a vaccine or low costs
of infection do not lead to markedly different centralized responses for many months.
We conclude that individuals and policymakers have at least until 2021 to learn about
the duration of immunity before it becomes truly important for decision making.
We are aware of three papers in the economics literature allowing for waning immu-
nity: Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt (2020b), Giannitsarou, Kissler and Toxvaerd
(2020), and Malkov (2020). These papers, however, differ from ours in crucial aspects
including the object of study, approach, and modeling choices. Eichenbaum, Rebelo
and Trabandt study the role of testing and quarantines in amodel with health state un-
certainty and check the robustness of their findings if immunity wanes; thus, they do
not fully explore how the duration of immunity affects contagion in the context of the
current pandemic. Malkov focus on how waning immunity affects the epidemiologi-
cal dynamics during the COVID-19 pandemic, but he does not allow individuals and
the social planner to endogenously react in his simulations. Giannitsarou, Kissler and
Toxvaerd assess the centralized problem during the pandemic in case immunity wanes,
but they do not contrast the centralized and decentralized equilibria and their results
differ from ours due to modeling and calibration choices.6 In Section 4.2, we contrast
in more detail our results with those in the three papers.
2 Model
We build an economic model of an epidemic in which agents face a trade-off between
social activity and exposure to the virus. This trade-off results from the link between
the epidemiological and utility-maximization blocks of the model. The link, in turn,
stems from our assumption, following Farboodi, Jarosch and Shimer (2020), Garibaldi,
Moen and Pissarides (2020), and Guimara˜es (2020), that new infections depend on the
number of susceptible and infected agents and the social activity chosen by susceptible
agents. The model is set in discrete time. The population is constant and of measure
one. We focus on symmetric equilibria in which agents with the same health state be-
6There are two other relevant differences. As Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt and Malkov, Giannit-
sarou, Kissler and Toxvaerd assume that all susceptible agents are alike irrespective of infection history.
And, as Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt, Giannitsarou, Kissler and Toxvaerd place their simulations at
the start of the pandemic and assume that only one non-pharmaceutical intervention is in place (testing
in the case of Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt and mandatory social-distancing in the case of Gian-
nitsarou, Kissler and Toxvaerd). Our last set of simulations in which we include the effects of other NPIs
brings, thus, further insights to the current policy discussion.
5
have the same. With this and applying the law of large numbers, we do not separately
denote individual and aggregate variables.
We distinguish agents that become susceptible after recovery from agents that were
never infected because the former, although no longer immune, may still have some
immunological memory. The remaining immunological memorymay allow for a lower
probability of infection, faster recovery, lower viral shedding, and lower costs of in-
fection. We refer to agents that were never infected as primary and agents that were
infected at least once as secondary. To further ease our exposition, we use the index
j ∈ {p, q}, when referring primary and secondary agents, respectively.
2.1 Epidemiological Block
The population in period t consists of five groups of agents: primary susceptible, sp,t,
primary infected, ip,t, recovered, rt, secondary susceptible, sq,t, and secondary infected,
iq,t. The number of new infections for each type is given by
βjaj,tsj,tit,
where βj is themeasure of contagiousness for susceptible agents of type j with βq ≤ βp,
aj,t ∈ [0, 1] is the social activity of susceptible agents of type j, and
it = ip,t + σiq,t (1)
is the number of infected agents. We adjust iq,t with σ ≤ 1 to allow secondary infected
individuals shedding less virus than primary infected ones.
The laws of motion governing the transitions between health states are the follow-
ing:
sp,t+1 = (1− βpap,tit)sp,t, (2)
ip,t+1 = βpap,tsp,tit + (1− γp)ip,t, (3)
rt+1 =
∑
jγjij,t + (1− α)rt, (4)
sq,t+1 = αrt + (1− βqaq,tit)sq,t, (5)
iq,t+1 = βqaq,tsq,tit + (1− γq)iq,t, (6)
where γj is the probability that an infected individual of type j recovers and α is the
probability that a recovered individual loses immunity. If α = 0 and ap,t = 1 for all t, the
model reduces to the canonical SIRmodel. If α > 0, σ = 1, βp = βq, γp = γq, and aj,t = 1
for all j and t, the model reduces to the canonical SIRSmodel.7
2.2 Decentralized Problem
7Under permanent immunity, α = 0, the number of secondary susceptible agents remains zero. Under
waning immunity, α > 0, with σ = 1, βp = βq, and γp = γq, identifying secondary agents is trivial.
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2.2.1 UtilityMaximization
In this section, we detail the lifetime utility maximization problem of a primary suscep-
tible agent. Agents derive utility from their social activity. The utility function, denoted
by u(a) is single-peaked and its maximum is normalized to zero at a = 1. The maxi-
mization problem of a primary susceptible agent is given by
max
{ap,t,ap,t}∞t=0
∑∞
t=0
∑
j
Λt
(
sj,tu(aj,t)− γjκjij,t
)
,
subject to Eqs. (2–6). In this maximization problem, the fraction of agents in each
health state group corresponds to the (subjective) probability of the agent being in that
state;Λ is the discount factor; and κj captures all the costs of recovering from the infec-
tion. As primary and secondary infected agentsmay respond differently to the infection
(e.g., differ in symptoms severity), we set κq ≤ κp. The decentralized optimum social
activity is, then, governed by
u′(aj,t) = βjit(Vsj ,t − Vij ,t), (7)
Vsj ,t
Λ
= u(aj,t+1) + Vsj ,t+1 − βjaj,t+1it+1(Vsj ,t+1 − Vij ,t+1), (8)
Vij ,t
Λ
= Vij ,t+1 − γj(κj + Vij ,t+1 − Vr,t+1), (9)
Vr,t
Λ
= Vr,t+1 + α(Vsq,t+1 − Vr,t+1), (10)
for both j ∈ {p, q} and Vx,t denotes the (shadow) value of the agent in state x ∈ {sp,
sq, ip, iq, r}. Eq. (7) summarizes the trade-off. Its left-hand side is the marginal util-
ity of social activity while its right-hand side is expected marginal costs resulting from
the possibility of infection. Marginal costs depend on how likely they are exposed by
marginally increasing activity, βjit. And it also depends on the change in the value
caused by exposure, which is always positive, Vsj ,t − Vij ,t > 0. Thus, susceptible agents
restrain their social activity, aj,t ≤ 1, to reduce exposure risk.
Eqs. (7-10), determining the behavior of primary agents, are symmetric along j.
Given that these equations do not depend on the (subjective) probability of being in
any health state, the same equations also determine the behavior of secondary agents.
Therefore, for brevity, we do not present the utility maximization problem of secondary
agents.
2.2.2 Decentralized Equilibrium
A decentralized equilibrium corresponds to a path of social activities, {ap,t, aq,t}, the
number of infected agents, it, state variables, {sp,t, sq,t, ip,t, iq,t, rt}, and shadow values,
{Vsp,t, Vsq,t, Vip,t, Viq,t, Vr,t}, that satisfy Eqs. (1–10).
2.3 Centralized Problem
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2.3.1 UtilityMaximization
In this section, we present the maximization problem of the social planner. The social
planner chooses socially optimal activity by directly influencing aggregate variables. In
particular, the maximization problem of the social planner is given by
max
{ap,t,ap,t}∞t=0
∑∞
t=0
∑
j
Λt
(
sj,tu(aj,t)− γjκjij,t
)
,
subject to Eqs. (1-6). Relative to the decentralized problem, Eq. (1) is the additional
constraint because the social planner internalizes how infected individuals affect con-
tagion. The socially optimum social activity is, then, governed by
u′(aj,t) = βjit(Vsj ,t − Vij ,t), (11)
Vsj ,t
Λ
= u(aj,t+1) + Vsj ,t+1 − βjaj,t+1it+1(Vsj ,t+1 − Vij ,t+1), (12)
Vij ,t
Λ
= Vij ,t+1 − γj(κj + Vij ,t+1 − Vr,t+1)− σj
∑
jβjaj,t+1sj,t+1(Vsj ,t+1 − Vij ,t+1) (13)
Vr,t
Λ
= Vr,t+1 + α(Vsq ,t+1 − Vr,t+1), (14)
for both j ∈ {p, q}, and σj =
{
1 if j = p,
σ if j = q.
Comparing this set of equations govern-
ing the optimal choice of the social planner with that governing the optimal choice of
agents in the decentralized problem (Eqs. 7-10), we can see that the only difference
is in the shadow values of the infected states. This difference reflects a key externality
emphasized in the literature: in a decentralized equilibrium, agents decide their social
activity without considering the risk of infecting others. As a result, both Vip,t and Viq,t
are lower in the social planner’s problem, which (ceteris paribus) restrains social activity
relative to the decentralized equilibrium. Part of our objective in this paper is to ana-
lyze how the possibility of recovered agents losing immunity distances decentralized
and centralized choices.
2.3.2 Centralized Equilibrium
A centralized equilibrium corresponds to a path of social activities, {ap,t, aq,t}, the num-
ber of infected agents, it, state variables, {sp,t, sq,t, ip,t, iq,t, rt}, and shadow values, {Vsp,t,
Vsq,t, Vip,t, Viq,t, Vr,t}, that satisfy Eqs. (1-6) and Eqs. (11-14).
3 Calibration
We summarize our parameter choices in Table 1. Eachperiod in themodel corresponds
to one day. The discount factor includes both a time discount rate, ρ, and the prob-
ability of finding a cure-for-all, δ, that would end the problem. In particular, we set
Λ = 1
1+ρ
1
1+δ
, ρ = 0.05/365, and δ = 0.67/365 reflecting a yearly discount rate of 5% and
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the probability of finding the cure-for-all of 67%within a year (see, e.g., Alvarez, Argente
and Lippi, 2020; Farboodi, Jarosch and Shimer, 2020).
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
Discount factor: Λ = 1
1+0.05/365
1
1+0.67/365
Cost of infection: κp = κq = 512
Average number of days as infected: γ−1p = γ
−1
q = 18
Infectiousness: βp = βq = 2.4/18
Average number of days immune: α−1 = 750
Relative viral shedding of secondary infected: σ = 100%
As in Farboodi, Jarosch and Shimer (2020) andGuimara˜es (2020), the utility of social
activity is determined by:
u(a) = log(a)− a+ 1, (15)
which guarantees that u(a) is single-peaked with maximum at a = 1 and u(1) = u′(1) =
0. We also closely follow Farboodi, Jarosch and Shimer to find the cost of infection, κp.
Assuming that the value of life is US$10million and assessing how much agents would
be willing to permanently reduce their consumption to permanently lower the proba-
bility of dying by 0.1%, we find that the value of life is 80000 in model units. Based on
this, we obtain κp using the probability of dying conditional on infection. The meta-
analysis of Meyerowitz-Katz and Merone (2020) suggests that about 0.64% of those in-
fected with the virus, die. Thus, we set κp = 512.
We follow Atkeson (2020) andmost of the economics literature assessing theCOVID-
19 pandemic and assume that infected individuals remain so for 18 days, γ−1p = 18. To
calibrate βp, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2020) and assume βp = 2.4/18, implying a basic
reproduction number, R0, of 2.4. This number is relatively optimistic in light of, for ex-
ample, theR0 assumed in Alvarez, Argente and Lippi (2020) of 3.6.
At this stage, the duration of immunity against COVID-19 andhow secondary agents
differ from primary agents is unknown. To calibrate the probability that recovered in-
dividuals lose immunity, we use the evidence regarding other coronaviruses surveyed
in Huang et al. (2020) and also the assumption in Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt
(2020b) and set α−1 = 1/750, implying that agents have immunity for about two years.
Regarding the remaining parameters, in our benchmarkwe simply assume that βq = βp,
γq = γp, κq = κp and σ = 100%. Therefore, our benchmark calibration implies a SIRS
model augmented with the endogenous choice of social activity.
We solve the model using a shooting algorithm as detailed in Garibaldi, Moen and
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Pissarides (2020). As a starting point, we assume that 1 in a million agents are primary
infected, ip = 1/10
6, and the remaining are primary susceptible.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Panels A and B of Figure 1 present how a waning immunological memory affects op-
timal decentralized and centralized dynamics, respectively. The blue (solid) lines as-
sume our benchmark, i.e., agents are immune for two years on average. The green
(dashed) lines assume, as a lower bound and consistent with Huang et al. (2020) and
Kissler et al. (2020), that immunological memory lasts only 10 months. The red (dot-
dashed) lines assume, as an upper bound and as in the economics literature (e.g. Al-
varez, Argente and Lippi, 2020; Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt, 2020a; Farboodi,
Jarosch and Shimer, 2020), that immunity lasts forever (implying an SIR model).
Two of our findings in Figure 1 are striking. First, if immunological memory wanes
(α > 0), then in both centralized and decentralized equilibria, social activity is severely
and permanently curtailed until the discovery of a vaccine or cure. This results from
the continuous flow of agents from immune to susceptible, implying a continuous flow
from susceptible to infected and, therefore, a permanent exposure risk. Thus, if immu-
nity wanes, COVID-19 reaches an endemic steady-state. In the centralized equilibrium,
social activity stabilizes at about 55% lower than absent the epidemic. In the decentral-
ized equilibrium, social activity reaches its minimum after about 200 days and then
recovers slightly to its long run value, 30% lower than absent the epidemic. If agents
never lose immunity, α = 0, the results are very different. In this case, all agents return
to normal activity as infections asymptotically disappear. This happens faster, albeit
at a higher social cost, in the case of the decentralized equilibrium, leading to much
higher peak infections. Furthermore, in the decentralized equilibrium, approximately
60% of the agents are infected at least once within three years, which differs substan-
tially from about 5% in the centralized equilibrium.
Second, the underlying duration of immunity barely moves the initial dynamics of
epidemiological variables and social activity for around 200 days in the decentralized
and 400 days in the centralized equilibrium. This result is partly explained by the low
accumulation of secondary agents as few agents obtain and lose immunity in the initial
months of the epidemic even when immunity wanes after 10 months, α = 1/300. But
other factors play important roles, especially in centralized equilibria. In decentralized
equilibria, agents do not take into account how their actions, by affecting infections,
change the pace at which they might be reinfected. As a result, social activity in de-
centralized equilibria is mostly affected by the dynamics of infected agents. As soon
as many agents start losing immunity and become susceptible and infected again, the
effects of waning immunity become visible in optimal social activities.
In centralized equilibria, however, the externalities of social activity are considered
10
Figure 1: The Role of Immunity Duration
Panel A: Decentralized Equilibrium
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Panel B: Centralized Equilibrium
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Susceptible
 = 1/750
 = 1/300
 = 0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0
0.005
0.01
Infected
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Secondary Agents
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Primary Activity
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Mean Activity
Note: Susceptible agents are sp,t + sq,t; infected agents are ip,t + iq,t; secondary agents are
sq,t + iq,t + rt; primary activity is ap,t (which, in this case, equals secondary activity, aq,t);
and mean activity is sp,tap,t + sq,taq,t + ip,t + iq,t + rt.
in decision-making. The social planner knows that by reducing social activity, it low-
ers and postpones infections and, thereby, decreases the number of secondary agents
that lose immunity. Furthermore, the social planner is aware of the costs of the en-
demic steady-state. These two factors combined motivate the social planner to con-
strain social activity by more when waning immunity induces an endemic COVID-19.
Yet, surprisingly, in our benchmark case, the optimal centralized social activity is al-
most unmoved by the duration of immunity for 400 days.
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The social planner aims to minimize the sum of the present value of the costs of
infection and of social-distancing. If immunity is permanent, Panel B of Figure 1 shows
that the best option to minimize social costs is to endure high social-distancing, post-
pone infections, and wait for the vaccine. If, on the other hand, immunity wanes, fu-
ture infection costs increase but their present value is substantially discounted because
the vaccine or cure is expected in 18 months. Furthermore, as social activity is heav-
ily constrained even if immunity is permanent, the marginal costs of social-distancing
are high and very sensitive to further increases in social-distancing due to the curva-
ture of the utility function. Put differently, the social planner lacks room to maneuver
to strongly react to waning immunity in the early months of the pandemic. These two
factors combined explain why waning immunity is relatively unimportant for many
months in determining optimal social-distancing.
To gain further insight, in Figure 2, we show how two key parameters change the
number of infected agents and social activity of primary agents in centralized equilib-
ria. Panel A depicts again the benchmark cases to ease comparison. Panel B depicts the
results when expected time to find a vaccine or cure is 4.5 years, implying δ is a third of
its benchmark value. Panel C depicts the results when the infection-fatality rate is ap-
proximately 0.21%, implying κj is a third of its benchmark value. This figure shows that
waning immunity matters in these two deviations from benchmark in the centralized
equilibria.8 The results are particularly staggering in the case of low δ: in this scenario,
peak infections occur much earlier and is more than 20 times higher when immunity is
persistent than when immunity wanes.
A lengthier period to discover a vaccine or cure, captured by a lower δ, implies that
the social planner must restrict social activity for more time to avoid infections and
wait for the vaccine or cure. We find that the corresponding increase in the present
value of social-distancing costs greatly exceeds the increase in the present value of the
costs of infection if immunity is permanent. Therefore, the social planner allows for
more infections. The opposite holds when immunity wanes. Technically, a lower δ re-
duces the discount factor, increasing the present value of the infection costs caused
by waning immunity and the endemic COVID-19. Therefore, the social planner reacts
even stronger to the pandemic when it emerges if immunity wanes and the vaccine is
expected later in time.
A reduction in the infection-fatality rate, captured by a lower, κj , implies less costs
of infection and, thus, more social activity whatever is α. But the rise in social activity
increases in the duration of immunity (i.e., decreases in α). When the costs of infec-
tion, κj , are lower, the implied point of the reduced social activity is under the flatter
range of the curved utility.9 Thus, the marginal cost of additional social-distancing is
also relatively low, increasing the room to maneuver of the social planner. Therefore,
8Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that the way waning immunity affects decentralized equilibria relies
much less on κp and δ.
9In an experiment (not reported), we varied the curvature of the utility function and find that the
changes in social activity brought by waning immunity decrease in the curvature.
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Figure 2: The Role of Immunity Duration - Centralized Equilibria
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Note: Infected agents are ip,t + iq,t; primary activity is ap,t (which, in this case, equals sec-
ondary activity, aq,t).
the social planner acts stronger from the onset of the pandemic to reduce the costs of
an endemic COVID-19 and gain time for the discovery of a cure or vaccine. This differ-
ence in optimal choices lead to clearly different disease dynamics: the faster immunity
wanes, the more the social planner postpones and reduces peak infections.
In sum, waning immunity implies a persistent reduction in social activity either
individually chosen or mandated. But because individuals lack altruism, implying a
weaker link between choice and (re)infection, the early response to the pandemic in
decentralized equilibria is not dependent on waning immunity. In centralized equilib-
ria, however, waning immunity may affect the early response to the pandemic depend-
ing on the magnitude of the costs of infection and critically on how likely a vaccine or
cure is expected to arrive. Yet, in our benchmark calibration, which we find plausible,
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waning immunity barely affects early optimal choices of social activity in the central-
ized equilibria.
4.2 Discussion
In this section, we contrast our findings with the three papers in the economics liter-
ature that study waning immunity. Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt (2020b) study
the role of testing and quarantining in a model linking consumption and labor choices
to contagion. They also find that decentralized individuals permanently reduce their
activity (consumption and labor supply) due to the endemic steady-state caused by
waning immunity. Furthermore, their Figure 9 suggests that, for over a year, waning
immunity is virtually irrelevant for decentralized decisions. Yet, waning immunity af-
fects their centralized equilibria in a way different from ours because of the different
policy instruments considered. Their testing and quarantining polices rule out en-
demic steady states because asymptotically all individuals are continuously tested and
infected ones are quarantined. Therefore, waning immunity neither restricts social
planner’s actions nor permanently constrains economic activity in Eichenbaum, Re-
belo and Trabandt (2020b).
Giannitsarou, Kissler and Toxvaerd (2020) study the effects of waning immunity on
social-distancing policy. Notable differences between our paper and theirs are as fol-
lows. They assume that the pandemic ends in six years (by the discovery of a vaccine),
ruling out any endemic steady state. As a result, social activity returns to normal in their
simulations. Moreover, the costs of infection and social-distancing are much lower
in their model. They assume that the costs of infection are 10% lower output by in-
fected and zero output by deceased only for the time span of the pandemic. The costs
of social-distancing are quadratic and finite in a mandated full-lockdown, which pro-
vide a vast room to maneuver for the social planner to act. Therefore, when immunity
wanes, they obtain deferment of peak infections and a negative relation between im-
munity duration and mandated social distancing (similar to our results in the low cost
of infection case, Figure 2, Panel C).
Malkov (2020) studies how waning immunity affects the dynamics of an epidemio-
logical model under different calibrations of the basic reproduction number. He con-
cludes that until close to peak infections, waning immunity barely changes the dis-
ease dynamics. Although Malkov does not include endogenous decision making in his
model, his findings are relatively close to our findings in the decentralized equilibria
as waning immunity also only matters close to peak infections. But his findings differ
substantially from our results in the centralized equilibria. In this case, the social plan-
ner takes into account the future costs of waning immunity in his early response to the
pandemic, which in turn, leads to different disease dynamics.
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5 Heterogeneous Susceptible Agents
So far, we have analyzed an SIRSmodel augmentedwith endogenous social activity. Us-
ing our benchmark calibration, in Figure 3, we illustrate how our results change when
secondary susceptible and infected agents differ from their primary counterparts in
three aspects. Figure 4 complements our illustration in Figure 3 by showing how our
results differ if δ and κp are low. Green (dashed) lines show the case in which secondary
susceptible agents are 75% less likely to be infected than primary susceptible agents;10
red (dot-dashed) lines show the case in which secondary infected individuals shed 75%
less virus than primary infected; yellow (dotted) lines show the case in which the costs
of infection are 75% lower for secondary agents; and blue (solid) lines show the bench-
mark. In the first two cases, even though all agents eventually lose immunity, asymp-
totic R0 is below 1 and, thus, the epidemic will asymptotically disappear as secondary
agents gradually replace primary agents. In the case of κq = 0.25κp, the cost of a rein-
fection is much lower but the flows between states do not asymptotically converge to
zero. That is, asymptotically, individuals are continuously infected but suffering much
less than in the beginning of the epidemic. In this case, COVID-19 converges to an en-
demic steady-state, which is similar to that of other coronaviruses giving rise to flu-like
symptoms (Edridge et al., 2020; Huang et al., 2020; Kellam and Barclay, 2020).
Figure 3 and Panel A in Figure 4 show that if secondary and primary agents dif-
fer, there are little changes to the optimal social activity of primary susceptible agents
for approximately a year and a half in both centralized and decentralized equilibria.
This contributes to a similar path for the number of susceptible (both primary and sec-
ondary) agents for many months. Thus, as in the previous section, our benchmark
calibration implies that any uncertainty caused by waning immunity is not much rele-
vant for several months after the start of the epidemic.
Our results in the centralized equilibria depend, again, on δ and κp. When it is un-
likely to discover a vaccine or cure (low δ), the early response to the pandemic critically
depends on whether COVID-19 becomes endemic. If it becomes endemic (benchmark
and κq = 0.25κp), the social planner restricts social activity further as the present value
of the costs of the endemic steady-state are larger. But if COVID-19 does not become
endemic (βq = 0.25βp or σ = 0.25), the social planner is more lenient. A low cost of
infection of primary agents, κp, grants room for maneuver for the social planner to act
early to endemic steady-states due to the curvature of the utility function. Therefore,
mandated social-distancing visibly increases with the overall costs of the pandemic in
Panel C of Figure 4.
The optimal behavior of secondary susceptible agents is much different from that
of primary susceptible agents irrespective of δ and κp. If it is unlikely that secondary
agents are reinfected (βq is low), they restrain social activity by much less than primary
ones, which is problematic from a social perspective because they expose other agents
10This implies a reduction of 75% in R0. Different combinations of changes in βj and γj leading to the
same fall inR0 imply similar results.
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Figure 3: Heterogeneous Susceptible Agents
Panel A: Decentralized Equilibrium
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Panel B: Centralized Equilibrium
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(especially primary) significantly. Thus, even if susceptible agents are unlikely to be
reinfected, policymakers should be aware that these agents are likely to be excessively
active.
This problem of excessive social activity in the decentralized equilibrium is even
worse if κq = 0.25κp. As agents are not altruistic, they only care about their own risks. A
lower cost of reinfection then significantly lowers their incentives to social-distance. In
contrast, the social planner would like secondary agents to substantially constrain their
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous Susceptible Agents - Centralized Equilibria
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activity because their viral shedding and probability of infection are unchanged and
many susceptible agents are still primary susceptible.11 The scenario of κq = 0.25κp
also shows that agents asymptotically constrain social activity, even in the decentral-
ized equilibrium, because COVID-19 becomes endemic and the costs of infection re-
main high (these costs imply a probability of dying of 0.16% in the benchmark). If
these costs were lower, closer to those of endemic human coronaviruses, agents in a
decentralized equilibrium would behave almost as if there was no virus which is what
we observed until the COVID-19 pandemic.
11In this regard, secondary agents are similar to young agents in models that breakdown agents based
on age (Acemoglu et al., 2020; Gollier, 2020). In those models, because young agents know that they are
less likely to suffer if infected, they are too active from a social perspective as they increase exposure of
older individuals.
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The results are very different if σ = 0.25. Recall that σ measures how likely sec-
ondary infected shed virus onto susceptible. Since σ pertains only to the externality
caused by secondary agents’ actions, it does not affect decisions in the decentralized
equilibrium: secondary susceptible agents act as primary susceptible agents. A social
planner, in contrast, would allow secondary agents to enjoy relatively more social ac-
tivity. Both primary and secondary agents, however, benefit indirectly from the lower
viral-shedding of secondary infected agents, which allows them to enjoy more social
activity, converging asymptotically to full social activity in both equilibria.
6 What If It Was Today?
Following the SARS-CoV2 outbreak, governments around the world have combined
several NPIs to change the natural course of the pandemic. To account for this change,
in this section, we base our simulations on initial conditions matching the current (epi-
demiological) state of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the (new) initial conditions, we accommodate a compromise between the epi-
demiological state in the US and four European countries, France, Italy, Spain, and the
UK, as of 1 July 2020. On this day, the fraction of (currently) infected population was
approximately 0.46% in the US; 0.09% in France and 0.02% in Italy.12 These numbers
are likely to be understated as authorities fail to test and identify many of infected and
especially asymptomatic people (see references in Stock, 2020 for evidence on the pro-
portion of asymptomatic). Bearing in mind the understatement and cross-country dif-
ferences in the numbers, we find a compromise at i = 0.2%. To set the initial number
of recovered agents, we look at the evidence from antibody surveys. In France, Spain,
and the UK, antibody surveys suggest that slightly more than 5% of the population has
antibodies against SARS-CoV-2.13 Given that the fraction of infected population ratio is
two to three times higher in the US than in France, Spain, and the UK, we find a com-
promise at r = 6%.
In all countries that we examined for this section, identified infected individuals are
quarantined. This NPI naturally reduces contagion and we model it as an exogenous
reduction in the social activity of some infected agents. In particular, we assume that
50% of infected agents, which is within the current estimated range of asymptomatic
cases, are identified and cannot enjoy maximum social activity. In case infected in-
dividuals are identified, they enjoy 40% of normal social activity, which increases the
expected costs of infection. Thus, average social activity of infected individuals falls
by 30%. Other NPIs, like mandatory mask use, differ across countries. In France and
the UK, mask use is only mandatory in public transport, whereas in Spain, it is manda-
12Statistics consulted in https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html on 2 July 2020.
13See the ONS COVID-19 Infection Survey for the UK; for France and Spain, see Salje et al. (2020) and
Polla´n et al. (2020).
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tory even in open-air spaces if it is not possible to maintain physical distance.14 In our
model, we treatmask use (mandatory or not) as an exogenous reduction in contagious-
ness, βp and βq , by 30%. In sum, these NPIs reduce βp and βq by slightly over 50%.
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We depict the results in Figures 5 and 6. Blue (solid) lines assume the benchmark
values for the the rest of the parameters. Green (dashed) lines assume that agents
are permanently immune. Red (dot-dashed) lines assume that in their contagious-
ness and cost of infection, secondary agents differ substantially from primary agents:
βq = 0.25βp, σ = 0.25, and κq = 0.25κp.
16 Compared to our previous simulations,
the other NPIs significantly elevate social activity because of the fall in contagiousness.
Furthermore, the simulations suggest that individuals and policymakers do not need
to know the duration of immunity and how secondary agents differ from primary ones
until at least 2021 even if δ and κp are low.
17 Thus, the combination of lower conta-
giousness and relatively high initial infections reduce the relevance of waning immu-
nity even in centralized equilibria, making the the social planner less responsive to fu-
ture infection costs. This suggests that if current NPIs remain in place, there is still
substantial time to learn about the duration of immunity. Yet, given the implications of
the mortality rate for social activity, and consistent with Hall, Jones and Klenow (2020),
learning about the actual infection-fatality rate seems highly important.
7 Concluding Remarks
It is likely that immunity against COVID-19 eventually wanes and those that are im-
mune today will face the risk of a reinfection (Edridge et al., 2020; Huang et al., 2020;
Kellam and Barclay, 2020; Seow et al., 2020). This scenario is especially problematic if
COVID-19 becomes endemic as other human endemic coronaviruses. We show that
if COVID-19 reaches an endemic steady-state and a vaccine or cure is not discovered,
social-distancing is here to stay. But, on the bright side, we also show that optimal
decentralized and centralized choices do not necessarily depend on waning immuno-
logical memory for many months following the initial outbreak/contagion. This is es-
pecially the case if a vaccine is expected soon, the costs of infection are already large
in the short run, and other NPIs that lower contagiousness remain in place. Before
making irreversible decisions, individuals and policymakers seem to have time to learn
more about immunological memory against SARS-CoV-2 and answer the call for sero-
logical studies from Kellam and Barclay (2020), Kissler et al. (2020), and Lerner et al.
14At the time thatwewrite this paper, France and theUKhave announcedmandatorymask use in shops.
15Crucially, R0 is still above one as the pandemic would asymptotically disappear if R0 < 1. But R0
permanently below one seems unlikely as pointed by the second wave of infections in Australia and South
Korea.
16In these simulations, we assume that the initial fraction of secondary susceptible and infected indi-
viduals is zero.
17Although there are slightly visible differences in terms of optimal primary activity if δ and κp are low,
the implied dynamics of infected individuals is almost unchanged. Optimal secondary activity depends
much more on the scenario for waning immunity, but there are very few agents that are secondary sus-
ceptible.
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Figure 5: What if It Was Today?
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Note: Optimistic refers to the case in which βq = 0.25βp , σ = 0.25, and κq = 0.25κp .
Susceptible agents are sp,t + sq,t; infected agents are ip,t + iq,t; secondary agents are
sq,t + iq,t + rt; primary activity is ap,t; secondary activity is aq,t; and mean activity is
sp,tap,t + sq,taq,t + 0.7(ip,t + iq,t) + rt.
(2020).
Yet, in 6-12 months, we do need to know more about how antibodies and T-cells
defend the human body against SARS-CoV-2. In particular, we must know how long
immunity lasts and whether individuals that were infected (secondary agents) differ
substantially from those that were never infected (primary agents). The longer immu-
nity lasts, the less demanding should social-distancing be. And, in the limit, if immu-
nity lasts a lifetime, then COVID-19 does not reach an endemic steady-state and social-
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Figure 6: What if It Was Today? - Centralized Equilibria
Panel A: Benchmark
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distancing will sooner or later be unwarranted. Furthermore, if secondary agents may
be reinfected but are somewhat protected against the virus, then COVID-19 may not
become endemic. Yet, the way in which secondary agents differ from primary agents
is crucial to design policy. For example, if most of the gains from the additional pro-
tection are private – because secondary agents are less likely to die or less likely to be
reinfected – then secondary agents are excessively active from a social viewpoint. If, on
the other hand, most of the gains from the additional protection are social – because
secondary agents shed less virus – then the decentralized and centralized equilibria are
closer and less social-planning is required.
Even though most of the economics literature assumes permanent immunity, this
simplification may not have dire consequences in the short run. If a vaccine or cure is
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expected soon, the costs of infection are not small, and other NPIs are in place, then
our model suggests that the optimal response in the initial months of the pandemic
is virtually independent of waning immunity. The same is true if secondary agents,
despite no longer immune, develop a strong protection against SARS-CoV-2 or shed
much less virus. But, if these conditions do not hold, many of the policy prescriptions
need to be revised as they rely on the possibility of herd immunity.
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A Robustness Checks of Decentralized Equilibria
Figure A1: The Role of Immunity Duration - Decentralized Equilibria
Panel A: Benchmark
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Note: Infected agents are ip,t + iq,t; primary activity is ap,t (which, in this case, equals sec-
ondary activity, aq,t).
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Figure A2: What if Primary and Secondary Agents Differ? - Decentralized Equilibria
Panel A: Benchmark
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Infected
Homogeneous
q = 0.25 p
=0.25
q = 0.25 p
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Primary Activity
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Days
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Secondary Activity
Panel B: Low Probability of Discovering a Vaccine or Cure ( =0.22/365)
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Note: Homogeneous refers to the case in which secondary and primary agents are alike.
Infected agents are ip,t + iq,t; primary activity is ap,t; secondary activity is aq,t.
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Figure A3: What if It Was Today? - Decentralized Equilibria
Panel A: Benchmark
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Note: Optimistic refers to the case in which βq = 0.25βp , σ = 0.25, and κq = 0.25κp . Infected
agents are ip,t + iq,t; primary activity is ap,t; secondary activity is aq,t.
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